Between a Rock and a Hard Place by Bäumler, Jelena
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KFG Working Paper Series • No. 42 • February 2020 
 
 
 
 
Jelena Bäumler 
The WTO’s Crisis: Between a Rock and a Hard Place 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3544022
2 | KFG Working Paper No. 42 | February 2020 
 
 
 
KFG Working Paper Series 
 
Edited by Heike Krieger, Georg Nolte and Andreas Zimmermann 
 
All KFG Working Papers are available on the KFG website at www.kfg-intlaw.de. 
Copyright remains with the authors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Berlin Potsdam Research Group  
International Law – Rise or Decline?   
Habelschwerdter Allee 34a 
14195 Berlin 
 
info@kfg-intlaw.de 
+49 (0)30 838-61521 
www.kfg-intlaw.de 
 
Bäumler, Jelena, The WTO’s Crisis: Between a Rock and a Hard Place, KFG Working Paper Series, No. 
42, Berlin Potsdam Research Group “The International Rule of Law – Rise or Decline?”, Berlin, 
February 2020. 
ISSN 2509-3770 (Internet) 
ISSN 2509-3762 (Print) 
This publication has been funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) 
Product of Freie Universität Berlin 
Commercial use is not permitted 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3544022
 The International Rule of Law – Rise or Decline? | 3 
 
 
 
The WTO’s Crisis: Between a Rock and a Hard Place 
 
Jelena Bäumler* 
 
 
Abstract: 
The perception of the WTO is currently one of an organisation in crisis. Yet, appraisal varies regarding 
its extent and seriousness: Is it merely a rough time or are we standing on the edge of destruction? 
The article will trace developments inside as well as outside the WTO in order to assess the magnitude 
of the crisis. It will be argued that while certain developments inside the organisation, when seen in 
accumulation would already warrant serious attention, only together with developments taking place 
outside of the WTO, the two strands of developments unfold their full potential for the crisis. The 
overall situation renders the WTO in a difficult position, as it is currently unable to adapt to these 
challenges, while keeping calm and carrying on might similarly further the crisis. While States might 
improve and further develop their trade relations in bi- and plurilateral agreements, it is only the WTO 
that reflects and stands for the multilateral post (cold) war order. 
  
                                                                 
* Prof. Dr. Jelena Bäumler is Professor of Public Law and International Law at the Leuphana University Lüneburg. 
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Introduction 
The WTO is not just any international organization. In many ways, it may serve as proof for the 
development of the post-Cold War era towards an international rule of law, setting regulations for a 
globalized market order as well as pursuing an unrestrained multilateral approach with an 
international organization potentially accessible for all States. It bears some of its defining features 
exactly from its creation during a very special time in history at the end of the Cold War, overcoming 
some elements that have played out as perceived weaknesses of other international organizations, 
including its precise and binding rules, a common framework without much room for reservations 1 
and a compulsory dispute settlement system including an oversight mechanism for its 
implementation. And indeed, in the years following its creation, the WTO appeared well-designed, 
efficient and robust. It attracted ever more members, spanning an almost universal net of economic 
relations around the globe2, its rules being broadly accepted and observed. In case a dispute arose, 
relatively fast proceedings would settle the dispute peacefully and in the majority of cases, the 
rulings were actually implemented.3 One could even go as far as claiming that the WTO overcame the 
‘compliance trilemma’ of international law by providing for widespread participation, ambitious legal 
norms and high compliance rates all at the same time.4 Criticism, albeit sometimes fierce and loud, 
rather appeared as a mandate to improve and further develop the organization, than calling into 
question its general functionality or its very right of existence. Overall, one may say, at least when 
viewed in isolation5, that the WTO was a success story in theory and practice.  
These glorious days seem to be over. The WTO has slipped into a deep crisis. The challenges are 
posed by developments inside as well as outside the WTO and have squeezed the organization into 
a position that leaves it with little room for manoeuvre. Inside the WTO, the members interact with 
a changed tone and attitude towards each other and the organization itself. Critique on the design 
of the rules, both procedural and substantive, constant and undisguised violations, accusations of 
overreach of the Dispute Settlement Body (hereinafter DSB)’s mandate leading ultimately to the 
destruction of the Appellate Body (hereinafter AB) as well as the inability to reform existing or to 
conclude new agreements due to incompatible and uncompromising positions of its members have 
weakened and undermined the WTO.6 At the same time, developments outside the WTO backfire 
negatively onto the multilateral institution and increasingly relegate it to the side-lines. First, and 
                                                                 
1 Generally, reservations are not allowed according to art XVI:5 of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Agreement (WTO Agreement) 1994, 1867 UNTS 154, except if provided in the respective agreement (E.g. art 15.1. 
Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement (hereinafter TBT Agreement), 18.2. Anti-Dumping Agreement (hereinafter 
ADA), 32.2. of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 1994, 1867 UNTS 14 (hereinafter 
SCM), 72 of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 1994 UNTS 299 
(hereinafter TRIPS), Annex III 2-4 Custom Valuation Agreement for developing countries, approval is required by 
the other members). Nevertheless, there is little actual relevance as can be inferred from the list of members’ 
reservations, Doc G/VAL/W/311.  
2 Currently 164 members, <https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm>.  
3 DG Azevêdo mentioned in his statement on occasion of the Twenty-fifth anniversary of the conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round on 12 September 2019; that ‘To date, the WTO has dealt with almost 600 trade disputes. Many 
disputes are resolved before they reach the litigation stage, but when they do proceed to that stage compliance 
with rulings is very high, at around 90 per cent.’ <https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spra_e/spra280_e.htm>. 
4 JL Dunoff, ‘Is Compliance an Indicator for the State of International Law? Exploring the “Compliance Trilemma”’, 
in H Krieger, G Nolte and A Zimmermann (eds), The International Rule of Law: Rise or Decline? (2019) 183.  
5  Leaving aside more general aspects such as the fact that it had contributed to the fragmentation of 
international law, for example, von Bernstorff, ibid, 46 et seq.   
6 Statement by DG Azevêdo (n 3). 
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foremost, the proliferation of preferential trade agreements 7 , in a quantitative as well as in 
qualitative dimension, have undermined one of its main principles, namely non-discrimination and 
have brought about the renationalization of products. Second, this increasingly leads to negotiations 
and the actual standard setting for international trade outside the WTO. Multilateralism, a global 
approach and perception of the WTO as the main negotiation forum is thereby considerably put in 
question.  
Has thus, we may wonder, the WTO reached peak-law and will crumble in the years to come? Of 
course, wise scholars remind us that this is not the first time that serious turbulences and trade wars 
in the international economic order albeit extremely worrying at the time, did, in the end, not 
translate into destruction, but eventually even into the next step of integration and a strengthening 
of the global institution.8 A prudent mindset might especially be important in order not to create 
damage by overemphasizing the ‘crises-narrative’. Yet, at the same time, on the edge of disruptive 
developments sleep wandering by just believing in the resilience of an institution when it is already 
on the glimpse of collapsing would similarly prevent from comprehending the seriousness of the 
current state of affairs as well as analysing realistically proposals for a way out of the crisis. For the 
WTO at least, the accumulation of recent developments warrants a careful assessment.  
The analysis will depart from analysing core developments taking place inside (Part One), as well as 
outside the WTO (Part Two) that led to the current crisis. Against this background, it will be explored 
whether International Economic Law rather straddles on the rise or decline side (or both) of current 
international law life and discusses reasons for and ways out of the crisis (Part Three), before offering 
some concluding remarks.  
  
Part One: Developments inside the WTO 
Recently, Director General Roberto Azevêdo conflated that: ‘[…] the global economic order is under 
severe strain. Powerful voices claim that national well-being is hurt, not helped, by international 
rules.’9 The reasons for this assessment will be traced along four main developments: First, it is now 
– at the latest – more probable than not that the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) may never be 
concluded and consequently, some of the initial promises made during the Uruguay Round towards 
especially developing countries will not be honoured. At the same time, the failure also diminishes 
hope for the general ‘reformability’ of the WTO, rendering the organization with the set of rules as 
they currently stand, which are regularly perceived by a wide variety of members as unsatisfactory 
(1). Second, obvious and systemic violations in open disregard of the rules and agreements are 
unfolding their damaging effects on the ability of the WTO to effectively guarantee fair and open 
                                                                 
7 Used here as a catch-all phrase, PTA (Preferential Trade Agreements) is the terminology used by WTO in order 
to refer to reciprocal preferential agreements – regional, bilateral or plurilateral, see WTO, World Trade Report 
(2011) 44 <https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report11_e.pdf >. 
8 E.g. Japan-US trade war in the 80s, J Kurtz, ‘Past as Prologue? Historical Parallels and Discontinuities in Modern 
Trade Wars’ (Kings College London Workshop, London, 2020) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3469496>. On 
Voluntary export restraints, see G Vidigal, ‘The Return of Voluntary Export Restraints?: How WTO Law Regulates 
(and Doesn't Regulate) Bilateral Trade-Restrictive Agreements’ (2019) 53 Journal of World Trade 187-210 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=3254196 >. 
9  Statement from DG Azevêdo of 17 October 2019 >https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spra_e/spra287_ 
e.htm>. 
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markets and the perception that most members observe most rules most of the time10 (2). Third, in 
the peaceful years, the WTO has failed to clarify its role in situations of increased tensions between 
its members, rendering security exceptions and countermeasures as two open flanks in the current 
escalating trade wars (3). Fourth, the destruction of the Appellate Body by one member, paired with 
the inability of all others to unite against the rioter leave one of its main organs with amputated 
power that will have negative effects over and above the dispute settlement system, but for the 
organization as a whole (4).  
1. No Progress in the DDA and the forecast of an everlasting ‘Reformstau’ 
In 2001, when the DDA was launched, the decision appeared timely: not only did it reflect a uniting 
moment after 9/11, but it was also a strong signal to developing country members that the promises 
made during the Uruguay Round had an actual chance of being kept.11 The Ministerial Conference 
expressly stated that ‘[t]he majority of WTO members are developing countries. We seek to place 
needs and interests at the heart of the Work Programme adopted in this Declaration.’12  
The beginning of the Round was indeed sanguine: Members expressed priority for improving the 
situation of developing countries and everyone showed strong motivation to reach compromise. 13 
The initial positive atmosphere became soon overshadowed by disputes over the so-called 
Singapore issues14 and the high expectations met with little actual proposals by developed countries, 
especially the EU and the US, in core sensitive areas such as subsidies and sectors, especially 
agriculture.15 As the years went by, the situation turned grimmer. The only agreement that could be 
achieved ever since the Uruguay Round16 is the Trade Facilitation Agreement (hereinafter TFA) that 
was concluded in Bali in 201317, eventually entering into force on 22 February 2017.18 The agreement 
requires accessibility and transparency of information regarding import and export and aims at 
smoothing and easing all processes related to cross-border trade. 19 Albeit it features an entire 
                                                                 
10 Borrowed from the famous statement by Louis Hankin: ‘almost all nations observe almost all principles of 
international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time’, How Nations Behave (1979) 47.  
11  World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc. WT/MIN (01)/DEC/1. 
(hereinafter Doha Declaration). 
12 Ibid, para 2.  
13 E.g. Subsidies in agriculture (para 13); market-access for non-agriculture products (para 16); interaction 
between trade and competition policy (para 24); trade facilitation (para 27); trade and transfer of technology 
(para 37); technical cooperation and capacity building (paras 38-41); least-developed countries (paras 42-3); 
special and differential treatment (para 44); see also para 4 for the commitment to the WTO ‘as the unique forum 
for global trade rule-making’.   
14  ICTSD, 1 Doha Round Briefing Series, 6 ICTS (2003) <https://www.ictsd.org/sites/default/files/downloads/ 
2008/06/doha6-singaporeissues.pdf >. 
15 Especially export subsidies are a major part of the broader package in the agriculture negotiations. Yet, the 
draft text for ministers to agree in Bali (that ended with the 2013 Bali Ministerial Declaration on Export 
Competition) stops short of making legal commitments <https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/ 
mc9_e/brief_agneg_e.htm#generalservices>  and <https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news13_e/agng_23 
may13_e.htm#export>. 
16  WTO, The WTO at Twenty: Challenges and achievements (2015) <https://www.wto.org/english 
/res_e/booksp_e/wto_at_twenty_e.pdf>, concludes that the WTO has achieved much over its first 20 years but 
the success of the WTO has inevitably given rise to new challenges. 
17 According to the Decision on 27 November 2014 (WT/L/940), the TFA is a Protocol to WTO Agreement. 
18 After obtaining the two-thirds acceptance of the Agreement from its 164 Members.  
19 See especially arts 1 and 5 (Publication and availability of information) and art 10 (Formalities connected with 
importation, exportation on transit) of the TFA. 
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section on special and differential treatment20, it does not tackle or resolve any of the hard questions 
of the DDA.  
Concerning the important systemic topics of the DDA, by now, it appears more probable than not 
that compromise for those topics will not be reached any time soon.21 For the ongoing every day 
import and export of goods and services, this might not be overly problematic. The real problem lies 
in the failure of having delivered on the Round: developing members felt that not even in a 
negotiation round that had their interest at the heart of the agenda and not even with regard to 
specific commodities or sectors was there enough determination of developed members to enter 
into binding commitments that would bring about actual changes to the situation of developing and 
least-developed members. 22 In fact, the single commodity cotton – for which the DSB had even 
confirmed the incompatibility of US subsidies with current WTO agreements23 – was often perceived 
as a litmus test, that had however failed, and with it the entire Round. 24  The last Ministerial 
Conference in Buenos Aires in 2017 ended without a common Ministerial declaration and produced 
only a small number of Ministerial Decisions on five topics25 as well as several joint statements 
supported by a varying subgroup of members.26  
In a more general way, the unwillingness and inability to conclude the Round almost twenty years 
after its initiation casts serious doubt on the general ‘reformability’ of the WTO by consensus among 
the currently 164 members.27 Important areas in which little or no progress could be made in the last 
decade include digital trade, e-commerce and related aspects of data flows, which are often 
perceived as some of the most pressing issues for the future development of global trade.28 The 
                                                                 
20 Arts 13-22 Section II of the TFA.  
21 See A Matthews ‘Doha negotiations on agriculture and future of the WTO multilateral Trade System’, QA - 
Rivista dell'Associazione Rossi-Doria, Associazione Rossi Doria, 1 (2014) 26-40 <http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/ 
record/160370/files/01-Matthews%20-%20EAAE%20135.pdf>; S Lester, ‘Is the Doha Round Over? The WTO's 
Negotiating Agenda for 2016 and Beyond’ (2016) 64 Free Trade Bulletin 2 <https://www.cato.org/sites/ 
cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/ftb64.pdf > and S Cho, Is the WTO Passé? Exploring the Meaning of the Doha Debacle 
(2009) 7 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1403464>. 
22 Ministerial Decision of Bali on Cotton (2013), reiterates members’ commitment to ‘on-going dialogue and 
engagement” to make progress in the negotiations on cotton according to the 2005 objectives of the Hong Kong 
Ministerial Conference (WT/MIN(13)/41 WT/L/916). 
23 WTO, United States — Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267. 
24  The Cotton-4 (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali). See K Anderson and E Valenzuela, ‘The World Trade 
Organization’s Doha Cotton Initiative: A Tale of Two Issues’ (2006) World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 
3918 <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/247241468010473451/pdf/wps3918.pdf> and D Sumner, 
Reducing Cotton Subsidies: The DDA Cotton Initiative (2006) <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ 
INTRANETTRADE/Resources/239054-1109114763805/Ch10_Sumner.pdf>. 
25  Work programmes on Fisheries (WT/MIN(17)/64), e-commerce (WT/MIN(17)65) and Small Economies 
(WT/MIN(17)/63) and a decision on the prolongation of TRIPS and non-violation complaints (WT/MIN(17)/66). 
26 WT/MIN(17)/61 Joint Ministerial statement on services domestic regulation; WT/MIN(17)/60 Joint statement on 
Electronic Commerce WT/MIN(17)/59; Joint ministerial statement on Investment Facilitation for Development 
WT/MIN(17)/58; Joint Ministerial statement - Declaration on the establishment of a WTO informal work 
programme for MSMES.  
27 See <https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm>.  
28  See <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ecom_e/ecom_e.htm> and also JP Meltzer, ‘A WTO reform 
agenda Data flows and international regulatory cooperation’ (2019) Global Economy & Development Working 
Paper 130 <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/WTO-Reform-Agenda_final.pdf>; this 
stands in stark contrast to FTAs having regularly incorporating e-commerce chapters into their coverage; see 
e.g. M Wu, Digital Trade-Related Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements: Existing Models and Lessons for the 
Multilateral Trade System (2017) RTA Exchange. Geneva: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development (ICTSD) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) <https://www.ictsd.org/sites 
/default/files/research/rta_exchange-digital_trade-mark_wu_-final.pdf>. 
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General Agreement on Trade in Services (hereinafter GATS) is still to a certain extent opaque and 
much less powerful than the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (hereinafter GATT). 29 Any 
positive effects out of the Trade in Services Agreement (hereinafter TISA) negotiations cannot be 
expected since the abrupt end of this process. 30 The same holds true for rules on currencies, 
competition and investment. In the same vein, so-called ‘trade and’- issues have not progressed. The 
initiative on an Environmental Goods Agreements (hereinafter EGA) has not been further developed 
since 2015. 31  No reactivation of the former ‘green box’ subsidies under the Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures Agreement (hereinafter SCM) has taken place that would enable members 
to support green energy or environmentally friendly industries on a clear legal basis.32 Similarly, the 
conclusion of an agreement on fishery subsidies planned for the end of 2019 was again postponed 
for another year.33 Human rights and labour rights remain issues outside standing WTO agreements. 34 
In short, hardly any visible progress was made in any significant core area in the WTO in the last 
decade. All those topics are currently not effectively regulated by the WTO, furthering the perception 
that the WTO is to a certain extent incomplete, especially when those areas have the potential of 
undermining or calling into question the legitimacy of other WTO commitments.35  
The perception of incompleteness of the WTO agreements has recently been openly instrumentalised 
as a core defence argument in the US written statement in the Section 301 dispute with China.36 
Besides its rather confusing construction of the relationship between domestic and international 
law, the US argues that the incompleteness renders the WTO partially illegitimate.37 Consequently, in 
view of the US, the Panel should allow justification of the measures taken against China under the 
public morals exception of Art. XX(a) GATT, based on the assumption that,  
                                                                 
29 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994, 1867 UNTS 187; General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) 1994, 1869 UNTS 183. On the functionality of the GATS generally see M Herdegen, Principles of 
international economic law (2nd ed., 2016) 226-71. 
30 In themselves problematic due to their open relationship with WTO. Yet, the negotiations on TISA are now on 
hold, see <https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/tisa/>. 
31 See <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/ega_e.htm>. 
32 A Genest, ‘The Canada—FIT Case and the WTO Subsidies Agreement: Failed Fact-Finding, Needless Complexity, 
and Missed Judicial Economy’ (2014) McGill IJSDLP, 10 <https://www.mcgill.ca/mjsdl/files/mjsdl/10-
2_genest.pdf>. 
33 Negotiations on fisheries subsidies were launched in 2001 at the Doha Ministerial Conference, and at the 
eleventh Ministerial Conference held in Buenos Aires in 2017, WTO members agreed to conclude the agreement 
on fisheries subsidies which delivers on Sustainable Development Goal 14.6 by the end of 2019 (now postponed 
to be agreed in 2020 in Nur-Sultan).  
34 E-U Petersmann, ‘How Should the EU and Other WTO Members React to Their WTO Governance and WTO 
Appellate Body Crises?’ (2018) 9-46, EUI Working Paper, RSCAS 2018/71 <https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream 
/handle/1814/60238/RSCAS_2018_71.pdf?sequence=1andisAllowed=y>. 
35 Relation of currency and competition with trade; see further below US argument in WTO, United States — Tariff 
Measures on Certain Goods from China, WT/DS543, 27 August 2019. 
36  WTO, United States — Tariff Measures on Certain Goods from China, WT/DS543 <https://www.wto.org/english/ 
ratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds543_e.htm>.  
37 ‘China’s policy and practice of state-sanctioned theft […] violates prevailing U.S. “standards of right and wrong” 
as reflected in the state and federal laws of the United States, under which the act of “theft” is universally 
deemed a criminal offense.’, US Written statement in WT/DS543, para 74 <https://ustr.gov/sites/ 
default/files/enforcement/DS/US.Sub1.%28DS543%29.fin.%28public%29.pdf)>. 
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China’s morally wrong behaviour further threatens to undermine U.S. society’s belief in the 
fairness and utility of the WTO trading system, if that system creates the conditions for, and 
fails to address, a fundamentally uneven playing field.38 
Although the argument might stand little chance of success, it reflects a deep discontent of a central 
WTO member about what it perceives as inchoateness and deficient functioning of the WTO rules 
regarding unfair trade policies not covered by current WTO agreements. Although the WTO never 
claimed to provide coverage of all aspects relevant for the economic relations among its members, 
the US position leaves the Panel in a dire situation and tone and arguments by the US certainly hung 
a Damocles sword over the Panel’s head.  
On a more general note, an organization that functions on rules that are locked-in in history without 
an actual chance of adaptation to prevailing challenges in an area that is constantly posing new 
questions and challenges by a vivid global market and under close scrutiny by national societies 
might stand an imminent risk of becoming of ever lesser interest to its members over time.39   
2. Broken windows in the WTO house: Systemic violations and their effects on the 
functioning of the WTO 
According to the broken windows theory, 
if a window in a building is broken and left unrepaired, all the rest of the windows will soon 
be broken [because] one unrepaired broken window is a signal that no one cares, and so 
breaking more windows costs nothing.40  
This section does not focus on violations of particular rules, it will rather aim to identify violations 
that are signs for broken windows that no one is willing or able to repair in the WTO legal order. In 
fact, in the last decade and even before trade tensions escalated into full-fledged trade wars, 
smashing ever more windows of the trade rules house, were worrying signs of systematic violations 
of agreements by an increasing number of members against each other.  
One of the evergreens of WTO in this regard is dumping and the corresponding anti-dumping 
measures.41 Regulating dumping is at the heart of a liberal market order, prohibiting members to 
introduce products into foreign markets below the market value.42 In the background of the very 
technical regulatory framework around the determination of the market value of a product, two main 
issues keep reappearing in WTO disputes on a more systemic level. First, how can the framework be 
applied fairly and equally when some members provide for strong state-driven elements in their 
economy43, especially but not restricted to China? Second, what is the allowed response, including 
                                                                 
38 Ibid., para 76.  
39 Turning to increasingly covering those issues in bi- and plurilateral agreements, see Part One, 3.  
40 GL Kelling and JQ Wilson: ‘Window-breaking does not necessarily occur on a large scale because some areas 
are inhabited by determined window-breakers whereas others are populated by window-lovers; rather, one 
unrepaired broken window is a signal that no one cares, and so breaking more windows costs nothing.’ 
<https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/>. 
41 See on the ADA in general <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm>. 
42 See art VI GATT and ADA <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm>. 
43 ‘Market Economy’: Economy in which fundamentals of supply and demand provide signals regarding resource 
utilization, see P Gregory and R Stuart, Comparing economic systems in the twenty-first century (2004) 538. On 
the contrary, a ‘state-driven or directed economy’ can be defined as a model whereby the State is instrumental 
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in terms of the obligation and extent of investigations and the fixing of the dumping margin 
especially with regard to the technique of so-called ‘zeroing’?  
The ADA stands as a reflection face and indeed the fault line for the harmonious coexistence of 
fundamentally different economic models under one common economic legal framework as well as 
the good faith of the members to observe and abide to the rules of that framework. The ADA is one 
of the most frequently cited agreement in WTO disputes44 and the usage of its instruments has 
sparked over the last decade. While formerly dumping allegations and imposing of anti-dumping 
measures occurred among the usual suspects45, since a number of years it appears like an all-time 
favourite instrument by any member against any other member.46 An increasing number of products 
is targeted by anti-dumping measures, often correlating exactly with a domestic market under 
pressure in the respective member State.47 Until 2016 the system at least concerning China48 was 
more or less stable, with its special status according to the accession protocol.49 With the expiration 
of the respective clause, dispute arose between China and several members as to the applicable 
proceeding for anti-dumping measures against Chinese allegedly dumped products.50 Yet, a WTO 
dispute that could have provided clarity was suspended by China just before the report came out, 
leaving this important and systemic question unresolved.51 With regard to calculating the actual 
dumping margin, the practice of so-called zeroing has been constantly ruled out by Panels and the 
Appellate Body. The by now more than 30 disputes that have dealt with this particular technique of 
calculating the dumping margin52 and the constant refusal by the US to ultimately adjust its practice 
of zeroing can by now be categorized as a systemic challenge to the WTO. In fact, violations of the 
ADA by both exporting and importing members can thus be categorized as one of the broken windows 
that appears as not receiving reparation. 
A similar observation holds true for subsidies and countervailing measures. China is also in the focus 
for its interwoven economic structure and the constant accusation of subsidies in all kinds of areas. 53 
                                                                 
in guiding economic development, based on the rule of the market, see L Che, Concept of State-Directed 
Economy (2019).  
44  A list of disputes citing the ADA can be found here: <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e 
/dispu_e/dispu_agreements_index_e.htm?id=A6#selected_agreement>.  
45  Usually of developed countries against certain developing countries. See <https://docs.wto.org 
/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S006.aspx?Query=(%20@Symbol=%20g/adp/d*)andLanguage=ENGLISHandCo
ntext=FomerScriptedSearchandlanguageUIChanged=true#>. 
46  See the database on <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm>; <https://www.wto.org/ 
english/tratop_e/adp_e/AD_InitiationsByExpCty.pdf>.  
47 By mid-2019 a total of 5725 anti-dumping initiations since 1995 have been surveyed with an increasing 
tendency <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/AD_InitiationsByExpCty.pdf>.  
48 In fact, 90 per cent of products from China were subjected to anti-dumping or countervailing measures before 
2019, see C Brown. The 2018 US-China Trade Conflict After 40 Years of Special Protection (2019) 16 
<https://www.piie.com/system/files/documents/wp19-7.pdf>. 
49 Accession of the People's Republic of China (WT/L/432), Decision of 10 November 2001. 
50 W Huo, ‘Introduction and Critical Analysis of Anti-dumping Regime and Practice in China Pending Entry of WTO: 
Transition toward a WTO-Modeled Trade Legal Mechanism’ (2002) The International Lawyer 36(1) 197-214 
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/40707651>. 
51  There can only be speculation about the reasons for China’s suspension <https://www.reuters.com/ 
article/us-usa-china-wto-eu/china-pulls-wto-suit-over-claim-to-be-a-market-economy-idUSKCN1TI10A>. 
52 See on this P Mavroidis and T Prusa, ‘Die Another Day: Zeroing in on Targeted Dumping–Did the AB Hit the Mark 
in US–Washing Machines?’ (2018) World Trade Review 2018 7 239-64 <http://econweb.rutgers.edu/prusa/ 
cv/65%20-%20zeroing%20targeted%20dumping.pdf>. 
53 R Eckhaus, ‘China’s exports, subsidies to state-owned enterprises and the WTO’ (2006), 17 China Economic 
Review 2006, 1-13. 
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Yet, systemic challenges with regard to subsidies is not all restricted to China. In several disputes 
the DSB has confirmed that subsidies even in the agricultural sector can be reviewed and be found 
illegal under the SCM, at least if they cause injury to another member. 54  The EU and the US 
nonetheless, by and large, subsidize their agricultural sector in open and blatant disregard of the 
rules and findings of the DSB.55 The agreement between the US and Brazil following the Upland 
Cotton dispute56 to the detriment of third States, has additionally increased the perception that the 
DSB is unable to ensure adherence to agreements in general but rather operates as a mechanism to 
resolve bilateral disputes at which end a bilateral agreement may even worsen the WTO-inconsistent 
situation for other members.57 It left behind another broken window unrepaired.  
A third example of violations with a systemic implication is related to intellectual property rights 
leading to the impression that some members are constantly not playing by the rules to establish a 
fair market order which values intellectual property rights as agreed upon in the WTO.58 Numerous 
disputes against China have confirmed various Chinese practices to constitute violations of WTO 
agreements, especially but not limited to TRIPS.59 And, while this is nothing uncommon as especially 
concerning important market powers their policies are more often under review,60 the piecemeal 
approach by China to rectify those shortcomings 61 has led to disappointment over its market-
economy commitments, questioning its constructive role for world trade law and the WTO, at least 
in this particular field. 
The steep increase of WTO-inconsistent measures as well as the spark in disputes, but also of 
countermeasures taken without prior reference to the DSB62 may, as has been observed by former 
Appellate Body Member Sacerdoti, rather not be 
an indication of a healthy dispute settlement system. On the contrary, it hints at a looming 
crisis of the system, and manifests a widespread disrespect of substantive and procedural 
                                                                 
54 Except there are in conformity with the Agriculture Agreement or do not fulfil the requirements of either arts 
3 or 5 SCM.  
55 V Ancharaz, Can the Doha Round Be Saved? The Future and The WTO: Confronting The Challenges - A Collection 
Of Short Essays (ICTSD Programme on Global Economic Policy and Institutions 2012) para 3 
<https://www.ictsd.org/sites/default/files/research/2012/07/the-future-and-the-wto-confronting-the-
challenges.pdf>. 
56 WTO, United States – Subsidies on Uplan Cotton,WT/DS267. 
57  The text of the Memorandum of Understanding can be found here: <https://ustr.gov/sites/ 
default/files/20141001201606893.pdf>; for an analysis see A Guitchons, Cotton provisions in the US 2014 Farm 
Bill, US-Brazil cotton settlement and other major developments in the world cotton market (2015) 
<https://unctad.org/meetings/en/Presentation/SUC%20MYEM2015%20Andrei%20Guitchounts.pdf>. 
58 J Bacchus et al., Disciplining China's Trade Practices at the WTO: How WTO Complaints Can Help Make China 
More Market-Oriented (2018) <https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/disciplining-chinas-trade-
practices-wto-how-wto-complaints-can-help>. 
59  See China TRIPS Cases: WTO, China — Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights, WT/DS362; WTO, China — Measures Affecting Financial Information Services and Foreign 
Financial Information Suppliers, WT/DS372; WTO, China — Measures Affecting the Protection of Intellectual 
Property Rights, WT/DS542; and WTO, China — Certain measures on the transfer of technology, WT/DS549. 
60 The EC/EU stood as respondent in 96 cases and the US in 156 cases. 
61 China has in fact quite a good record of implementing WTO reports for the 41 disputes that had been brought 
between 2004-18, of which 27 had found WTO inconsistent measures, see J Bacchus et al. (n 58); W Zhou, China's 
implementation of the rulings of the World Trade Organization (2019).  
62 See especially Part Two, 3.  
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rules, such as resort to unilateral measures and countermeasures without following the DSU63 
procedures first. 64  
3. Two Pandora’s boxes: Trade wars & security exceptions - and an unhealthy 
commonality of the two  
Resorting to measures and countermeasures has especially led to an escalation of tensions between 
members in clear violation of WTO rules and agreements in what is now regularly labelled as trade 
wars, first and foremost between the US and China65, but also e.g. between Japan and South Korea 66 
and UEA et al. and Qatar. 67  The initial measures, but also the resort to countermeasures have 
disrespected and violated the rules and procedure provided in the DSU.68  
At the heart of those developments lay two different, but interconnected sets of questions, namely 
the role of the security exceptions clause and Art. XXI GATT more generally for the wider WTO system 
and the relationship between WTO law and general international law when it comes to 
countermeasures.69 Both dimensions share the commonality of providing for ‘a source of new and 
unexpected problems’ 70 as with regard to both, WTO members have failed to develop in more 
harmonious times clear guidelines for the robustness of WTO law for serious tensions and trade wars, 
in which WTO members resort to measures and countermeasures that may or may not be covered by 
the WTO agreements.  
a) How securely designed is the security exceptions clause? 
Art. XXI GATT has long been – depending on the perspective – a sleeping beauty or buried landmine 
in the GATT. It had been included right at the beginning, but for almost 70 years of GATT’s life it played 
no decisive role in any dispute. 71 Yet, the failure to have a clear understanding of the role and 
                                                                 
63 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (hereinafter DSU) 1994, 1869 
UNTS 40. 
64 G Sacerdoti, The WTO in 2018: Systemic Developments, Disputes and Review of the Appellate Body’s Reports, 
(2019) 6-7 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3392194>. 
65 Section 301 dispute between US and China (WT/DS543/1).  
66 Since 2015, latest development is a request for consultation by Korea, see WTO, Japan —Measures related to 
the Exportation of Products and Technology to Korea, WT/DS590 <https://www.wto.org/english 
/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds590_e.htm>. 
67 See WTO, United Arab Emirates — Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, and Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS526. 
68 Especially in the so called Steel and Aluminium cases, that have also been brought to the attention of the WTO 
in altogether 12 disputes: WTO, United States — Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products; WT/DS544; 
WTO, United States — Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products, WT/DS548;  WTO, United States — 
Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products, WT/DS550; WTO, United States — Certain Measures on Steel 
and Aluminium Products, WT/DS551; WTO, United States — Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products, 
WT/DS552; WTO, United States — Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products, WT/DS554; WTO, United 
States — Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products, WT/DS556; WTO, United States — Certain Measures 
on Steel and Aluminium Products, WT/DS564; WTO, United States — Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium 
Products, WT/DS547; WTO, United States — Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products, WT/DS556; WTO, 
Canada — Additional Duties on Certain Products from the United States, WT/DS557; WTO, European Union — 
Additional Duties on Certain Products from the United States, WT/DS559. 
69 Please note that the defence by Japan for its measures is not yet, available and not yet predictable.  
70 Cambridge dictionary, ‘Pandora’s Box’. 
71 Under the GATT 47 art XXI (b) (3) became relevant in five disputes, see Analytical Index on art XXI, pp. 602-5; 
under GATT 94 only in one panel report, namely Russia – Traffic in transit, the provision received broader 
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meaning of Art. XXI GATT is especially frivolous against the background that even at the time of 
negotiations of the GATT, it was warned, ‘the atmosphere inside [the organization72] will be the only 
efficient guarantee against abuse.’73 Even back then – and it is not without a certain cynical turn in 
history – the US delegate brought forward that  
[…] we cannot make it too tight, because we cannot prohibit measures which are needed purely 
for security reasons. On the other hand, we cannot make it so broad that, under the guise of 
security, countries will put on measures which really have a commercial focus.74 
It appears now as if the actual design of Art. XXI GATT has not efficiently prevented the anticipated 
risks. A deteriorated atmosphere and increasing invocation of Art. XXI GATT to guise commercial 
interests seem to have both realized at the same time.  
In its first invocation in 2017 by Russia, the ‘security measures’ actually related to a dispute that was 
more to the heart of the initial conceptualization of Art. XXI GATT, as the Russian measures were 
indeed imposed at a time of serious dispute over Eastern Ukraine and Crimea between the two 
members, arguably qualifying as a ‘time of war or other emergency in international relations’ as 
stipulated by Art. XXI (b) (iii) GATT. Russia prohibited traffic in transit through its territory for 
Ukrainian products to reach other States.75 Russia prevailed in the case based on the fulfilment of 
the preconditions for this subparagraph. The Panel applied an objective-subjective-objective test, in 
which it examined the objective circumstances for invoking Art. XXI GATT, i.e. whether the situation 
was one of ‘war or other emergency in international relations’ and more on a subjective level whether 
the member presented arguments for the measures to be taken in order to respond to the security 
threat and again more objectively whether this argument was not implausible.76 
However, the more problematic issue related to Russia’s primary line of reasoning in that Russia had 
argued that the panel lacked jurisdiction for even determining the preconditions of Art. XXI GATT, as 
this provision, in the eyes of Russia was a self-judging clause.77 In view of the wording ‘nothing in this 
Agreement shall prevent’ in Art. XXI GATT, a member may only provide information on the measures 
it had imposed for security reasons, while any determination  
what essential security interests of a Member are, what actions are necessary for protection 
of such essential security interests, disclosure of what information may be contrary to the 
essential security interests of a Member, what constitutes an emergency in international 
                                                                 
discussion and was decisive for the outcome of the dispute, see Analytical Index GATT 1994 – art XXI 
(Jurisprudence), paras 10-14. 
72 International Trade Organization at the time.  
73 Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, 
Verbatim Report, E/PC/T/A/PV/33 (July 24, 1947), 21 (US-41). 
74 EPCT/A/PV/33, 20-1 and Corr.3. 
75 WTO, Russia –Traffic in Transit – Report of the Panel, WT/DS512/R, para 2.1. 
76 Ibid, para 7.56.  
77 WTO, Russia –Traffic in Transit - First Executive Summary of the Arguments of the Russian Federation, 
WT/DS512/R/Add.1, para 47: ‘The Russian Federation is of the view that Article XXI (a) and (b) of the GATT is of a 
self-judging nature. Each of the WTO Members individually and without any external involvement determines 
what its essential security interests are and how to protect them. Other reading of this Article will result in 
interference in internal and external affairs of a sovereign state’. 
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relations, and whether such emergency exists in a particular case […] all […] are outside the 
scope of the WTO.78  
The only member that supported Russia’s view at the time was the USA, now following the same line 
of argumentation as the defendant in the steel and aluminium cases79 and in other cases as a third 
party80. Following the report in Russia – Traffic in Transit, the US has argued that the panel had totally 
misconstrued Art. XXI GATT in that it is upon the member invoking that clause - and that member 
alone - to apply this provision rendering the dispute outside the scope of jurisdiction of any panel. 81 
In comparison to Russia, the US in its defence statements in the steel and aluminium disputes82 did 
not even argue the cases further in substance.83 The US, similarly relies strongly on the wording 
(especially the word ‘considers’) and the negotiating history as well as on a disputed subsequent 
agreement that in their view confirmed the status of the self-judging character of Art. XXI GATT.84 The 
panel in Russia – Traffic in Transit, in turn, relied mainly on the object and purpose of the GATT and 
the DSU of providing security and predictability in international trade relations. Indeed, if all 
members were allowed to invoke a provision to their own gusto, without any option of jurisdictional 
oversight that would be a Trojan Horse for any (trade) agreement. Additionally, the Panel considered 
that any subparagraphs would indeed be superfluous if the only requirement was a declaration of 
the respective member of having taken the measure for alleged security reasons.85 
While both arguments have stronger and weaker points, the established instruments of 
interpretation reach their limits in terms of the underlying question of both views, namely the overall  
perception and role of the WTO and its agreements more generally. It is this underlying 
conceptualization that renders the question so delicate: has the WTO come close to a legal trade 
order that was not and cannot be meant to have left room for a self-judging clause outside of the 
jurisdiction of panels and the AB? Or is it still merely an agreement between international sovereigns 
that finds its boundaries in the exercise of sovereignty of its members when it comes to their security 
interests? The Panel decided this aspect in the former way, relying on Art. 3.2 DSU, the object and 
purpose of the WTO and the GATT in general and the limitation that follows from that for the 
interpretation of Art. XXI GATT in particular. The US and to a lesser extent Russia openly question this 
understanding of the GATT and DSU and the US, similarly to its arguments with regard to the role of 
the DSU86, calls upon the members and the DSB to return to a more constrained interpretation on 
matters related to sovereignty and geopolitics.87  
                                                                 
78 Ibid, para 60.  
79 See footnote 68 for a list of all steel and aluminium disputes.  
80 WTO, United Arab Emirates — Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, and Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS 526.  
81 WTO, Russia — Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit- Ukraine Written Statement, WT/DS512/1 G/L/1151. 
82 See (n 68). 
83  E.g. WTO, United States — Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products, US Written Statement, 
WT/DS552.  
84 Namely Decision concerning art XXI of the General Agreement, L/5426, see ibid, 6. 
85 WTO, Russia –Traffic in Transit – Report of the Panel, WT/DS512/R. 
86 See Part One, 2.  
87 Statements Delivered to the General Council by Ambassador Dennis Shea U.S. Permanent Representative to 
the World Trade Organization <https://geneva.usmission.gov/2019/10/15/statements-by-the-united-states-at-
the-wto-general-council-meeting/>.  
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Three additional aspects require attention: first, the panel report has not been appealed and, there 
is not and – as will be seen shortly – there will most probably not be a final and authoritative decision 
by the AB on the issue any time soon. Of course it is possible that all panels concerned with the 
question may apply the same reasoning as the one in Russia-Traffic in Transit. Yet, it can be expected 
that ultimately, other members will keep on pursuing the Russia/US-line of argumentation and 
portray the initial decision as a mere erroneous panel decision without any meaning for other 
disputes thereby constantly putting in question the legitimate exercise of jurisdiction by a panel in 
a GATT Art. XXI-dispute.88 Yet, even though quite unlikely for several reasons, due to the lack of an 
AB ruling, it is also not impossible that a panel might actually follow the line of reasoning of a 
defendant and denounce its jurisdiction, which would set a critical example.  
Second, there are very few incidences in which the US and Russia have concurring views.89 Most 
interestingly and maybe counter-intuitive, China in its third party submission did not share the view 
that the panel lacked jurisdiction to review Art. XXI GATT and argued that indeed the preparatory 
work as well as the Decision on Art. XXI taken on 30 November 1982 90  supported the general 
reviewability of this provision.91  Yet, although China and other States agreed on the jurisdiction over 
Art. XXI GATT, 92 it together with a number of other States indeed supported a restrained review of a 
panel due to the sensitive issues involved.93 Indeed, it can be presumed that even more members 
will at least argue for a limited standard of review, once they have invoked Art. XXI GATT for measures 
taken for alleged security reasons.94  
Third, in comparison to the Russia/Ukraine state of affairs, invocation of the US in the relations 
between e.g. the US and the EU – a situation that not even prima facie, albeit those States had more 
harmonious times in their history, come close to a situation of war or other emergency in their 
bilateral relations, warrants concern. The US reliance on Art. XXI GATT for additional tariffs on steel 
and aluminium products by the US is thus, on its face, an attempt to justify these tariffs on specific 
products with regard to which the domestic industry came under pressure. Quite obviously, none of 
the alternatives of Art. XXI (b) (i)-(iii) GATT is fulfilled.95 Yet, with regard to the US position and despite 
non-fulfilment of the preconditions of Art. XXI (b) GATT, it stands to reason that the US, having not 
even argued the case further, will not accept or implement a panel decision that confirms jurisdiction 
on Art. XXI GATT and ultimately finds that its preconditions were not met. 
                                                                 
88  See WTO, United States — Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products, US Written Statement, 
WT/DS552, 42.  
89  See WTO, Russia – Traffic in transit- US Third Party Statement, WT/DS512/ANNEX D, 106. 
<https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/DS/US.3d.Pty.Stmt.%28as%20delivered%29.fin.%28public%
29.pdf>. 
90 Decision concerning art XXI of the General Agreement, L/5426. 
91 WTO, Russia –Traffic in Transit – Report of the Panel, WT/DS512/R/Add.1, 82.   
92 Ibid., e.g. Australia (69); Brazil (73); Canada (76); EU (84); Japan (89); Singapore (99). 
93 E.g. Australia, 72; Turkey, 103; to a lesser extent Brazil.  
94 The written Statement by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is not yet available, but it can be expected that UEA 
will bring forward a similar argument, see WTO, United Arab Emirates — Measures Relating to Trade in Goods 
and Services, and Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS526. 
95 The text of art XXI lit. b GATT reads: ‘(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are 
derived; (ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic in other goods 
and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military establishment; (iii) 
taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations’. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3544022
 The International Rule of Law – Rise or Decline? | 17 
 
 
 
However, if really Art. XXI GATT was to be accepted as an all-out-option, either by lack of jurisdiction 
or by a very broad discretion upon its application, this would considerably weaken the WTO. 96 
Invocation, as envisaged by the US, would allow any State to, with regard to a particular economic 
sector and without the situation coming close to a serious disturbance in the international relations 
between two stats, impose protectionist measures by simply relying on some kind of security 
interests. The obvious way of overcoming these uncertainties related to Art. XXI GATT at once would 
be a change of its wording or a general interpretation according to Art. XI.2 WTO Agreement, both not 
very realistic options at present. 
b) Countermeasures in trade wars 
In the defence in its Section 301 dispute with China the US did not ground its measure in a 
justification based on a particular GATT provision, but it rather argued that the US’ measures were 
lawful countermeasures against what it perceives as ‘unfair trade practices’ by China.97 The US frankly 
construed the US – China Section 301 dispute in essence as follows:  
Fundamentally, both the United States and China have recognized that this matter is not a 
WTO issue: China has taken the unilateral decision to adopt aggressive industrial policy 
measures to steal or otherwise unfairly acquire the technology of its trading partners; the 
United States has adopted tariff measures to try to obtain the elimination of China’s unfair 
and distortive technology-transfer policies; and China has chosen to respond – not by 
addressing the legitimate concerns of the United States – but by adopting its own tariff 
measures in an attempt to pressure the United States to abandon its concerns, and thus in an 
effort to maintain its unfair policies indefinitely.98 
Thus, according to the US:  
By taking actions in their own sovereign interests, both parties have recognized that this 
matter does not involve the WTO and have settled the matter themselves. Accordingly, there 
in fact is no live dispute involving WTO rights and obligations. 
The US argument requires attention in two ways: first, the US does not clearly establish that China 
has been violating international law, rendering a countermeasure argument without merit.99 Second, 
and more relevant with regard to its actual perception of the role of the WTO, it argues that measures 
that by themselves are covered by WTO agreements, namely a tariff increase on Chinese products, 
but that respond to measures outside the scope of WTO agreements, were also to fall outside the 
WTO ratione materiae because of their characterization as countermeasures.100 
                                                                 
96 Voon argues that ‘…the security exception lies at the center of multiple explosive disputes, posing a potential 
threat to the WTO’s very existence’, T Voon, ‘The Security Exception In WTO Law: Entering a New Era.' AJIL 
Unbound, 113, (2019) 45-50 <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-journal-of-international-
law/article/security-exception-in-wto-law-entering-a-new%20era/CF8C3DCDF2CD924CAEEDD147840668F9>. 
97 WTO, United States — Tariff Measures on Certain Goods from China, US Written Statement, WT/DS543 (n 36).  
98 Ibid., para 9. 
99  It has been argued that forced technology transfer could be partially covered by art 39 TRIPS, see J Bacchus 
and S Lester (n 58).  
100 WTO, WT/DS543 (n 36). 
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The underlying question of whether countermeasures are possible by resorting to general 
international law or whether the GATT is (still in this sense) a self-contained regime is contested. 101 
It has generally been rejected for a number of reasons.102 Leaving aside the question whether actually 
the preconditions for countermeasures under general international law were fulfilled in the US-China 
relations or not, from the viewpoint of WTO-law, two arguments oppose this suggestion outright: 
first, members according to the WTO rules are required to follow a sequence of steps before imposing 
measures to counter WTO-inconsistent measures.103 Yet, the direct resort to countermeasures would 
open a second path unforeseen by the rules in the WTO agreements. Second, if members were 
allowed to respond to violations that undoubtedly are outside the scope of current WTO agreements, 
by resorting to measures regulated within the WTO thereby violating their WTO commitments, this 
would open the economic toolbox despite having committed to certain e.g. tariffs with regard to a 
certain product towards all members.104 The immediate question would be whether members could 
only react to measures related to economic aspects or whether they could also rely on other 
international law violations, such as violations of environmental obligations or the law of the sea. 
Yet, allowance of instrumentalization of economic measures as response to any kind of international 
law violation or even measures not in breach of international law and ultimately for reaching 
geopolitical aims would exactly weaken a stable and predictable legal framework for international 
trade relations. 
c) An uncomfortable commonality  
Another dimension of the current trade conflicts signals a decrease in respect for the WTO 
framework, namely the reactions by those against which the measures were addressed, reacting WTO 
inconsistent themselves, albeit maybe less from a moral but from a legal point of view.  
The WTO order is based on a strict sequence of steps to be followed in case of a WTO violation by a 
member before allowing resort to countermeasures.105 After consultations, a panel is established, an 
appeal must be awaited and only after a reasonable period of time and an actual determination as 
to the non-compliance, a member may request permission to react to violations by a suspension of 
concessions, while over the appropriate level once more an arbitrator has to decide.106 In comparison 
to general international law, 107  a member may not take things into its own hands and react by 
immediately imposing countermeasures. Only after all the steps have been followed through of a 
formal procedure and adoption of the reports by the DSB, may a member suspend concessions in 
the form of raising of tariffs or cross-retaliation in other sectors.108 This process had for around 25  
                                                                 
101 J Pauwelyn, ‘The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?’ 95 AJIL 3, 535-78. 
102 A Bianchi and L Gradoni, Developing Countries, Countermeasures and WTO Law: Reinterpreting the DSU 
against the Background of International Law (2008) 4 <https://www.ictsd.org/sites/default 
/files/downloads/2009/02/reinterpreting_dsu.pdf>. 
103 See Part One, 3.  
104  See the schedules of concessions of each member here: <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ 
schedules_e/goods_schedules_table_e.htm>. 
105 According to the DSU included in Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement.   
106 Arts 4, 6, 12, and 22 (especially 22.2) DSU.  
107 Especially art 49 ILC Articles on the responsibility of States, GA/RES 56/83.  
108  If, within 20 days after the expiry of the reasonable period of time, the parties have not agreed, the 
complainant may ask the DSB for permission to impose trade sanctions against the respondent that has failed 
to implement. Technically, this is called ‘suspending concessions or other obligations under the covered 
agreements’ (art 22.2 of the DSU). Concessions are, for example, tariff reduction commitments. 
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years, by and large, been accepted and followed by the members.109 Even when members had fierce 
disputes over WTO-inconsistent measures, they would usually await panel proceedings before 
imposing retaliatory measures.110  
Neither the US in its initial measures nor the EU 111 and China have followed this sequence of steps as 
outlined, but have reacted unilaterally by increasing duties on certain products to offset the tariffs 
imposed by the other side immediately.112 Lamp argues with regard to the EU, that 
[t]he most plausible answer is that they [the responding members] perceived the US measures 
as an attempt to coerce them and saw immediate retaliation as necessary to deny the US any 
opportunity to use the measures as negotiating leverage.113 
While the observation might hold true, it does not cure the problem, that also the EU and other 
members that like to portray themselves as adhering to the rule of law and proclaim to strengthen 
the multilateral order 114  similarly damage it by resorting to unilateral measures driven by a 
comparable logic of power play. Additionally, it instigates other members to do the same, implying 
it to be a legitimate policy option in order to protect national interests.115  
In a somewhat twisted logic, the US argued that China’s resort to the DSB constitutes a misuse of the 
dispute settlement mechanism requesting the panel to make a finding that the parties found their 
own solution according to Article 12.7 DSU, basically by imposing measures and countermeasures 116, 
including some covered by the WTO and some not. Under this perception, it would not anymore be 
the claimant who would be in a position to define the subject matter of the dispute, but the behaviour 
prior to the dispute that could render a dispute outside of the scope of jurisdiction. This stands in 
contradiction to the wording of Article 23.1 and Article 6.1 DSU, which state: ‘If the complaining party 
so requests […]’.117 The position is overall not in line with the design of the WTO dispute settlement 
system, introduces an alien clean-hands argument and would ultimately mean a return to jungle law 
(or ‘might is right’), where parties act based on their strength and power without the ability to resort 
to the rule of law and the DSB. 
 
                                                                 
109  R Brewster, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement: Can We Go Back Again?’ 113 AJIL Unbound 61, 62-3 
<https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-journal-of-international-law/article/wto-dispute-
settlement-can-we-go-back-again/BA9985348C5BE20F8EF11FD620A48BEF#>. 
110 For example, the US patiently awaited the required decisions in WTO, European Communities — Measures 
Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26, to retaliate against the WTO-inconsistent import 
prohibition of hormone treated beef from the US. See R Brewster (n 109). 
111 The EU justifies these additional duties by relying on the Safeguards Agreement (arts 8.2 and 8.3) while the 
USA has not itself officially qualified their measures as falling under the Safeguards Agreement, WT/DS559, see 
EU written statement <https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/october/tradoc_158389.pdf >. 
112 See reactions of EU and China, <https://edition.cnn.com/2019/07/02/economy/us-tariffs-on-eu/index.html>; 
<https://fortune.com/2019/10/08/trump-china-tariffs-trade-war-us-economy-impact/>. 
113 N Lamp, ‘At the Vanishing Point of Law: Rebalancing, Non-Violation Claims, and the Role of the Multilateral 
Trade Regime in Trade Wars’ (2019) Queen’s University Research Papers 2019-02, 7. 
114  See e.g. the Alliance for Multilateralism, <https://new-york-un.diplo.de/un-en/news-corner/alliance-
multilateralism/2250628>.  
115 See R Brewster (n 109). 
116 US First Written Statement (n 36) 14.  
117 See also J Bäumler, ‘WTO‘ in G Krenzler, C Herrmann and M Niestedt (eds), EU-Außenwirtschafts- und Zollrecht 
(C.H. Beck 2019), para 216.  
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4. Destruction of the AB: Sounding the death knell for the WTO?  
A common introduction to the WTO dispute settlement system is a reference to it as the ‘crown jewel’ 
of the WTO.118 And due to its distinctive features, one tends to think that rightly so: it was compulsory, 
efficient and, in most cases, due to its strict adherence to the rule of law highly authoritative. Many 
panel and AB reports could, due to their fine and careful crafting and commendable examination of 
interpretation methods, serve as study cases in legal exercise books. In at least two major aspects, 
the WTO dispute settlement system is distinct from that of international law dispute settlement in 
general and the system during the GATT-time in particular: its compulsory nature and the effectively 
automatic adoption of reports as well as the increase in authority and coherence by a second 
instance.119 These features enabled small and economically weak States to sue even much more 
powerful members120 and reassured all members that despite imperfection of some of the rules and 
agreements, at least it could be trusted that the existing ones were enforceable. In 2009, after failure 
on finalizing the DDA, it was contested that ‘[…] one might suspect, the WTO’s dispute settlement 
system would remain intact regardless of Doha’s destiny.’121 This does not hold true as of 11 December 
2019.  
It is well known that the US has for quite some time criticised the AB and the reappointment blockage 
of particular judges in 2003, 2011 and 2016, especially when it concerned a non-US judge,122 was 
regarded as a strong sign of increasing discontent.123 In the latter case, open accusations of adopting 
reports in excess of rights and obligations of WTO members served as explanation for the US 
position.124 Under the Trump administration, the level of systematic attack and criticism paired with 
actively allowing the running out of time for reappointment of new judges below the minimum 
amount of three judges and finally led to the discontinuity of the AB on 11 December 2019. With only 
one judge left, no more cases can be appealed, with the mandate of the last judges to – and even 
that is disputed –allowing only to finish cases that had been appealed prior to the termination 
date.125  
The most prominent arguments of the US were the overreach of the mandate and competencies of 
the AB and the DSB more generally, exceeding of timeframes as set out in the DSU, the 
characterization as precedence of AB decisions as well as the treatment of domestic law.126 But the 
                                                                 
118  A Reich, The Effectiveness of the WTO Dispute Settlement System: A Statistical Analysis (2018) 1 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=2997094>. 
119 See on the functioning of the Dispute Settlement system, P Van den Bossche and W Zdouc, The Law and Policy 
of the World Trade Organization (2016) 156. 
120 E.g. WTO, United States — Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services 
(Complainant Antigua and Barbuda), WT/DS285. 
121 S Cho, (n 21), at 7. 
122 E Fabry and E Tate, ‘Saving the WTO Apellate Body or returning to the wild west of trade?’  Jacques Delors 
Institute, (2018), 6 <http://institutdelors.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/SavingtheWTOAppellateBody-
FabryTate-June2018.pdf>. 
123 E-U Petersmann, (n 34).  
124 E Fabry and E Tate (n 122). 
125 See Rule 15 Working Procedures for Appellate Review, WT/AB/WP/6.  
126 Statements by the United States at the WTO General Council Meeting on 15 October 2019 
<https://geneva.usmission.gov/2019/10/15/statements-by-the-united-states-at-the-wto-general-council-
meeting/>; see for a critical assessment of the role of the secretariat J Pauwelyn, The Role of the Secretariat in 
WTO Dispute Settlement (and the AB Crisis) (2019) <https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2019/09/the-role-of-the-
secretariat-in-wto-dispute-settlement-and-the-ab-crisis.html>. 
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US has also raised even more systemic aspects, such as that an impasse at negotiations has led to 
‘unchecked “institutional creep” by the Appellate Body as Members push to achieve through 
litigation what they haven’t achieved or can’t achieve at the negotiating table’; that in the US view 
the perception of the AB as an international court with judges that produces jurisprudence is a total 
misconception against the backdrop that panels and the AB were intended to act as agents of the 
parties directly involved in the dispute and that authoritative interpretation127 can only be provided 
by the members and not the AB.128 Moreover, it conceives the overreach of timeframes by panels and 
the AB as a sign for the agents (i.e. panels and the AB) of disobeying their masters, disregardful of 
the complexity of the facts and legal questions involved.  
Of course, the role of panels and the AB 129  and the development their reports have taken, is 
significant when seen over time. It was largely their achievement to resolve some of the open 
tensions e.g. with respect to environmental questions to, by way of interpretation and especially by 
an evolutive interpretation of e.g. Article XX GATT130 or the SCM131. Yet, a comprehensive study recently 
accomplished, did not – except regarding the excess of timeframes – confirm any violation of 
provisions of the DSU by panels or the AB concerning their mandate.132 This further warrants the 
impression that the decision to deconstruct the AB had more political than tangible legal reasons. 133  
Following the criticism of the US, a number of reform proposal were put on the table.134 None of them 
has found enough supporters and the discussions reach in all kinds of directions. While some of the 
proposals might stand real potential to actually improve detected aberrations, the prompt option to 
have saved the AB immediately would have been uniting against the US and vote according to the 
majority voting option of Article IX.1 WTO Agreement, when it was clear that consensus was blocked 
by the US.135 Petersmann argues:  
The text of Article IX:1 (‘where a decision cannot be arrived at by consensus, the matter at issue 
shall be decided by voting’) confirms that WTO members are legally required (‘shall’) to 
overcome illegal ‘blocking’ of the filling of AB vacancies by such majority decisions in order to 
meet their collective legal duties to maintain the AB as prescribed in Article 17 DSU, similar to 
                                                                 
127 Art 17 of the DSU. 
128 Statement by the United States at the WTO General Council Meeting on 15 October 2019, (n 126).  
129 J Pauwelyn and K Pelc, Who Writes the Rulings of the World Trade Organization? A Critical Assessment of the 
Role of the Secretariat in WTO Dispute Settlement (2019) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3458872>. 
130 See e.g. WTO, United States — Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna 
Products, WT/DS381; WTO, Canada — Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program, WT/DS426; WTO, European 
Communities — Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos, WT/DS135; WTO, United States 
— Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/DS61; GATT, United States — Restrictions 
on Imports of Tuna, (Not adopted, circulated on 3 September 1991) and GATT, United States — Prohibition of 
Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada (Panel finding adopted on 22 February 1982). 
131 WTO, Canada – Measures Relating to the Feed-in tariff Program, WT/DS426. 
132 J Lehne, Crisis at the WTO: Is the Blocking of Appointments to the WTO Appellate Body by the United States 
Legally Justified? (Carl Grossmann, 2019), passim. 
133 J Lehne, ‘Guest Post: Is the Blocking of Appointments to the WTO Appellate Body by the United States Legally 
Justified?’ (IELP, 10 November 2019) <https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2019/11/guest-post-is-the-blocking-of-
appointments-to-the-wto-appellate-body-by-the-united-states-legally-ju.html>. 
134 E.g. the European Union, China, Canada, India, Norway, New Zealand, Switzerland, Australia, Republic of Korea, 
Iceland, Singapore and Mexico raised concerns  with  the  AB’s  approach  to  treat  its  own  reports effectively 
as precedent that panels are to follow absent ‘cogent reasons’ (WT/GC/W/752); see also R Brewster, ‘The Remedy 
Gap: Institutional Design, Retaliation, and Trade Law Enforcement’ (2011)  80 George Washington Law Review 1, 
102, <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2146121>. 
135 E-U Petersmann (n 34). 
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the existing WTO procedures for appointing the WTO Director-General through a majority 
decision ‘where a decision cannot be arrived at by consensus’. 136 
This would have been a strong sign of all members that they would not allow one member to threaten 
and deconstruct the multilateral legal order. Yet, contrary to the usual perception of the US against 
the rest, a recent survey concluded that also other WTO members shared the US position that the AB 
had been going beyond its mandate at times.137 Members used the opportunity and started to discuss 
reform options, thereby allowing the crisis to deepen and to unfold its full destructive potential. 
Individual members commenced concluding agreements to bilaterally resolve the appeals impasse, 
providing for options for particular cases and particular members, but leaving unresolved the future 
of the AB as a systemic issue, falling into the trap of bilateralism instead of a strict upholding of 
multilateralism for the WTO in general and the AB in particular.138 Especially the EU has not been able 
to unite enough members behind its positions and to fight for the multilateral system without 
restrictions.139 At least, a new effort to find an interim solution among 17 members based on Article 
25 DSU ensures a two-step mechanism, albeit any eventual decisions will not carry the same weight 
as those of the AB and have also not yet found wider support among WTO members.140  
What to make out of the disappearance of the AB? After all, other international organizations and 
tribunals also function without an appeals mechanism. Many States still resort to the DSB for their 
disputes, even in face of the AB’s absence and will probably continue to do so, including the US141, 
indicating that the DSB might also function with the panel as first and last instance. Yet, the dangers 
of ‘appeals in the void’142 describing the possibility of members to appeal a panel report that will  
never receive a report by the disabled AB, might even lead to a prevention tool for the adoption of a 
panel report and thus contains a real potential of providing members with a veto against a 
                                                                 
136 Ibid, 8; of course, this suggestion is in light of the footnote to art IX WTO Agreement, providing that the rule 
of art 2 para 4 DSU requiring consensus regarding any decision taken by the DSB, not unproblematic. Yet, it is 
rather an appointment than a decision and Petersmann rightly points out that the obligation to maintain the 
AB might render a reference to majority voting possible. In support also HS Gao, ‘Disruptive Construction or 
Constructive Destruction? Reflections on the Appellate Body Crisis’ (2019) Singapore Management University 
School of Law Research Paper 29/2019, 20-21 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3422025>; 
J Hillmann, Three Approaches to Fixing the World Trade Organization’s Appellate Body: The Good, the Bad and 
the Ugly, 11 <https://www.law.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Hillman-Good-Bad-Ugly-Fix-to-
WTO-AB.pdf>. 
137 M Fiorini et al., WTO Dispute Settlement and the Appellate Body Crisis: Insider Perceptions and Members’ 
Revealed Preferences (2019) 19 et seqq. <https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/files 
/BSt/Publikationen/GrauePublikationen/MT_WTO_Dispute_Settlement_and_the_Appellate_Body_Crisis_Surve
y.pdf>. 
138 See e.g. the agreement EU-Canada Interim Appeal Arbitration Persuant to art 25 <https://trade.ec.europa.eu/ 
doclib/docs/2019/july/tradoc_158273.pdf>.  
139 A Gonzalez and N Veron, ‘EU Trade Policy Amid the China-US Clash: Caught in the Cross-Fire?’ (2019) Peterson 
Institute for International Economics Working Paper 19/2019, 13 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=3431323>. 
140  The declaration of the EU and 16 members can be found here: <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/ 
presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_113>. 
141 In 2019, the US brought only one case to the DSB (India — Additional duties on certain products from the 
United States, WT/DS585). 
142 J Pauwelyn, WTO Dispute Settlement Post 2019: What to Expect? What Choice to Make? (2019) <https://ssrn. 
com/abstract=3415964>. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3544022
 The International Rule of Law – Rise or Decline? | 23 
 
 
 
detrimental panel decision.143 Thus, the dysfunctionality of the AB might also affect the functioning 
of the panel stage and eventually unravel the entire dispute settlement system. 
 
Part Two: Developments outside of the WTO 
The WTO is not only under pressure by developments taking place at the inside, but also by activities 
at the outside. In fact, the two spheres interact: the less capable the WTO appears of regulating 
international trade relations effectively and comprehensively, the more members resort to other fora 
and negotiate agreements among a smaller group of like-minded States. This is exactly what has 
happened since 2006, when the US increased its efforts for bi- or plurilateral trade negotiations, with 
the EU soon to follow this approach. It is by now almost a commonplace to complain about the 
proliferation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) that has led to the famous Spaghetti-Bowl 
image of Baghwati.144 Yet, the problem is not only restricted to the sheer number of PTAs, but extends 
to their content in a qualitative sense, regulating aspects beyond and differently than the WTO 
agreements. Additionally, to the legal problems arising with regard to WTO-plus, minus and extra 
obligations from the viewpoint of the WTO, another element warrants further consideration, namely 
that of standard setting taking place outside of the WTO and particularly according to the conception 
of the most powerful parties at the negotiating table.  
Those backlashes from the outside shall be traced along the following three lines: First, the 
proliferation of bi- or plurilateral trade agreements marginalizes the WTO from a sheer quantitative 
point of view and questions its core pillar MFN (1). Second, the undefined legal relationship between 
the WTO and deviating obligations in PTAs challenges WTO obligations also from a qualitative point 
of view (2). Closely related and as a consequence, with large PTAs standard setting increasingly takes 
place outside the WTO, negotiated by a handful powerful States with carefully selected like-minded 
friends and to the detriment of concentrating negotiations in the WTO forum with a more 
participatory and equal negotiation setting (3). 
1. Proliferation of Preferential Trade Agreements – Is most-favoured nation 
turning from the rule to the exception?  
The GATT has always operated against the background of PTAs between two or more of its 
members. 145 Article XXIV GATT allows free trade agreements based on the perception that trade 
liberalization first in smaller, often regional settings, will eventually lead to further trade 
liberalization on the global level.146 Yet, the inherent tension between the most-favoured nation 
                                                                 
143 The US has in fact notified the DSB of an appeal on 18 December 2019 of the panel report in United States – 
Countervailing Duty Measure on Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from India: Recourse to art 21.5 
DSU by India, WT/DS436/RW, see WT/DS436/21; that communication was followed by another joint 
communication by India and the US the legal meaning of which is however unclear, see WT/DS436/22.  
144 The term was first used by J Bhagwati in ‘US Trade policy: The infatuation with free trade agreements’ (1995), 
Discussion Paper Series No 726 <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/161436448.pdf>. 
145 G Vidigal (n 8), Issue 2 at 19. 
146 Art XXIV: 4 GATT: ‘The contracting parties recognize the desirability of increasing freedom of trade by the 
development, through voluntary agreements, of closer integration between the economies of the countries 
parties to such agreements. They also recognize that the purpose of a customs union or of a free-trade area 
should be to facilitate trade between the constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the trade of other 
contracting parties with such territories’.  
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principle as enshrined in Article I GATT (requiring to treat like products from all members equally) 
and better treatment between two or more members only, already played a significant role during 
the negotiations at the ITO conferences.147 The outcome is a rather complex design of Article XXIV 
GATT with a number of preconditions that have to be met by PTAs in order to be compatible with the 
GATT.148  
As of 17 January 2020, 483 free trade agreements have been notified to the WTO and 303 are actually 
in force.149 By now, Djibouti and Sao Tomé and Principe are the only two States not member to a 
notified RTA.150 The high number of PTAs has led to only about 50 per cent of goods still being traded 
under the WTO-MFN tariff.151 Against the background that MFN is one of the core principles of the 
GATT, the steep increase in PTAs seriously erodes one of the founding pillars of the WTO and will 
eventually render MFN as the exception and not the rule in the future.  
Despite efforts to increase transparency of PTAs under the WTO regime, the forest of PTAs gets thicker 
and more opaque by the year. The members as well as the DSB, similarly to having missed clarifying 
Article XXI GATT, have failed to set clear and straightforward preconditions for PTAs when the number 
was relatively manageable.152 In fact, the WTO DSB has not, with regard to any PTA, ever made a clear 
statement as to its compatibility with Article XXIV GATT or not.153 For some reason or the other, 
members have rarely challenged other PTAs and appear to accept inconsistent PTAs, not willing to 
break the stalemate that prevails with regard to questions of compatibility of PTAs with the WTO 
agreements.  
In former times, members at least complied with the requirement that substantially all the trade was 
required to be covered in order to be in line with Article XXIV:8 GATT154. Nowadays, some agreements 
not even on their face, comply with the requirements as laid out by Article XXIV GATT. For example 
the recent US-Japan deal that was just signed, covers a limited number of products and aims at 
ensuring better access for US agricultural products to the Japanese market only.155 Similarly, the US-
China deal has a very limited coverage and serves the purpose of securing quotas for US agricultural 
products to the Chinese market.156 In the same vein, the agreement currently negotiated between the 
US and the EU to prevent the US from imposing additional tariffs on cars from Europe, sometimes 
embellished as TTIP-light, does not even aim at covering ‘substantially all the trade’ between the EU 
                                                                 
147  WTO discussion paper, ‘RTAs and the WTO: A troublesome relationship’, 26-7 
<https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/discussion_papers12b_e.pdf>. 
148  See on the interpretation of Art XXIV GATT, Analytical Index, Art XXI GATT 
<https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/ai17_e/gatt1994_art24_jur.pdf>; see also P Hilpold, 
Regional Integration According to Article XXIV GATT - Between Law and Politics (2003) <>; JH Mathis, Regional 
Trade Agreements in the GATT/WTO: Article XXIV and Internal Trade (2001) 39 et seqq. 
149 WTO, Regional Trade Agreements <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm>. 
150 See <http://rtais.wto.org/UI/publicPreDefRepByCountry.aspx>. 
151 World Tariff Profiles, publication by WTO, ITC and UNCTAD, (2019). 
152 On the disputed aspects of art XXIV GATT see generally P Van den Bossche and W Zdouc (n 119), 648-72.  
153 Not even in the Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing, WT/DS34.  
154 Equivalent in Art V GATS.  
155 S Lester, ‘The U.S.-Japan Trade Deal: Can a Political Agreement Liberalize Trade Without Institutions?’ (IELP, 
07 October 2019) <https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2019/10/the-us-japan-trade-deal-can-a-political-
agreement-liberalize-trade-without-institutions.html>. 
156 The Guardian ‘ US-China trade deal “totally done”, Trump aide Lighthizer says’ (15 December 2019) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/dec/15/us-china-trade-deal-trump-lighthizer>. 
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and the US. 157  These agreements will have detrimental effects for other States by altering fair 
competition, especially when granting certain quotas for products from one country, and are thus 
not in line with Article XXIV GATT requiring that third members are not negatively affected by a PTA. 158 
Additionally, it can be expected that these agreements will encourage other members to foster 
agreements for certain sectors and products only, without having to undergo the complications of 
liberalizing substantially all the trade between the parties.  
Another side effect comes with the proliferation of PTAs, namely that the application of different 
rules and tariffs for different products increasingly requires the determination of the origin of a 
particular product. Birth certificates of products thus become incrementally important. Under MFN, 
the origin of the product mainly revolved around the question whether the product derived from a 
WTO member or not. 159  With the increase of PTAs, punitive tariffs and countermeasure duties 
requiring different treatment for those products at the border, the renationalisation of products 
features prominently. This creates an impediment for trade, especially since the Rules of Origin in 
the WTO are rudimentary and leave a wide margin of discretion to the members.160 It is for those 
reasons that Jagdish Bhagwati contested, that the world, when infested with these PTA ‘termites’ is 
prone to an interwar economic balkanization redux.161  
2. Plus, -minus, -extra obligations and how they relate to the WTO  
On the other side of the spectrum of product and sector specific PTAs sit comprehensive economic 
and trade agreements that regulate, in line with their title, a wide range of topics related to 
international economic relations between the parties. Some of these issues are covered by WTO 
agreements and some are not.162 In relation to the WTO, they are usually referred to as WTO-plus, -
minus and extra provisions, depending on their respective design with regard to the corresponding 
WTO obligation. 163 What makes them tricky is their uncertain relationship with WTO obligations, 
especially concerning WTO-plus and –extra obligations, but also WTO-minus obligations. While WTO-
minus obligations provide for less obligations than what parties had committed themselves to in the 
WTO, WTO-plus obligations go beyond commitments on the multilateral level. 164  WTO-extra 
                                                                 
157  See <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-a-balanced-and-progressive-trade-policy-to-
harness-globalisation/file-eu-us-trade-talks>. 
158  Especially an RTA shall not raise trade barriers for third parties, art XXIV:4 GATT, see WTO, Turkey — 
Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products- Appellate Body Report, WT/DS34/11, 25 February 2000, 
para 57.  
159 Of course, for Anti-dumping and anti-circumvailing measures the origin is similarly of concern, see e.g. the 
results of the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices - Informal Group on Anti-Circumvention — Formal Meeting 
on the Meeting of 25 October 2017, where some members raised concerns in specific anti-dumping actions listed 
in semi-annual notifications.  
160 See on rules of Origin <https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/22-roo_e.htm>. 
161 J Bhagwati, Termites in the Trading System: How Preferential Agreements Undermine Free Trade (Oxford 
University Press 2008). 
162  See e.g. the table of contents the Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement (CETA) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ceta-chapter-by-chapter/> . 
163  On these terms, J Ya Qin, The Challenge of Interpreting 'WTO-Plus' Provisions (2010) 
<https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/a553/9b418f4feec666d515b5a4e02bad37e5cf0e.pdf> and M Ruta, 
‘Preferential trade agreements and global value chains: Theory, evidence, and open questions.’ (2017) Global 
Value Chain Development Report, 1 (WPS8190) <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en 
/991871505132824059/Preferential-trade-agreements-and-global-value-chains-theory-evidence-and-open-
questions>. 
164  H Horn et al., Beyond the WTO? An anatomy of EU and US preferential trade agreements (2009) 4 
<https://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/imported/publications/bp_trade_jan09.pdf>. 
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obligations concern aspects currently not covered by the WTO and beyond its current mandate and 
therefore do not directly relate to WTO obligations.165  
In a number of disputes the DSB had before it the question of the compatibility and effects of WTO-
minus obligations, including the question whether Article 41 (1) VCLT was applicable166, but never 
came to a straight answer.167 So called voluntary export restraint agreements are an increasingly 
relevant example of WTO-minus agreements. Therein a member, more or less voluntarily, agrees to 
export less than the market would allow in order to spare another member’s domestic market from 
competition.168 While presumably not in conformity with WTO agreements, especially the safeguards 
agreement,169 it is uncommon for a panel or the AB to get into a position of making a finding on a 
clause that is part of an agreement outside of the WTO. Those clauses and agreements will rarely 
reach dispute settlement, as neither party may have an interest in subjecting them to dispute 
settlement resolution. Yet, they have an effect on global trade in making trade less free and allowing 
geopolitics to re-enter economic relations in which market access and tariffs to a great extent 
depend on the relative power between the parties involved. 
The same holds true for WTO–plus and –extra obligations in that they not only undercut the WTO 
agreements, but also change the members terms of trade in agreements outside the scope of 
jurisdiction of the WTO. They lead to a diversification of rules and render the field of international 
economic law unclear and convoluted.   
Vidigal rightly observes  
WTO-extra provisions challenge the WTO not so much because they conflict with WTO rules as 
because they establish an alternative institutional setting for the development of new trade 
rules. Institutional competition and fragmented rules could end up making trade more difficult 
rather than easier. 170 
3. Standard setting or why weaker States will suffer mostly from bi- and 
plurilateral trade negotiation settings  
Very closely related to the last aspect and going hand in hand with comprehensive coverage and new 
approaches in economic agreements, new standards for international trade are increasingly set 
outside the WTO. 171  The WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures agreement (hereinafter SPS 
Agreement) and Technical Barriers to Trade agreement (TBT) were main achievements because of 
their incorporation and dissemination of international standards.172 The WTO set the legal framework 
                                                                 
165 M Ruta (n 163). 
166 According to WTO, Appellate Body Report, Peru–Agricultural Products, WT/DS457, para 5.112, it does not seem 
to be the case.  
167 See especially WTO, Mexico — Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WT/DS308 and WTO, Peru — 
Additional Duty on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products, WT/DS457 (n 166). 
168 Vidigal (n 8), Issue 2,187-210.  
169 Especially art 11.1(b) Safeguards Agreement, ibid, 196-8. 
170 Ibid, 191-2.  
171 Especially argued with regard to TRIPS; A Taubman, The Variable Geometry of Geography: Multilateral Rules 
and Bilateral Deals on Geographical Indications (2019) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3372740>. 
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for trade taking place internationally and provided for a common set of rules for all members to be 
followed.  
Yet, in the last decade, the four central actors in the WTO, generally referred to as the ‘quad’ 
consisting of the US, Europe, Canada and Japan have started to push for new standards in their 
FTAs,173 especially concerning ‘trade and’-issues, including sustainable development, environment, 
labour and human rights, but also e.g. rules on competition and currency manipulations. 174 The 
comprehensive agreements negotiated and agreed upon reflect the incorporation of many more 
topics and aspects and broaden the regulatory scope of trade agreements.175 With the negotiations 
in more intimate settings, often between a limited number of States, power can be and in fact is 
exerted more directly and immediate, especially if one of the major powers, EU, China or the US is 
involved in the process. The three have different ways of pushing their will. While the EU follows a 
softer approach, yet insisting on including considerably more WTO-plus and -extra provisions, which 
are in turn not to the same extent enforceable; the US postulates less demands, yet more directly 
and it ensures their enforceability.176 China, in turn, tends to have a rather subtle seductive way of 
negotiating and concluding agreements based on economic incentives provided to its partners.  
Yet, all those strategies have in common to push their own regulatory approaches and to ensure 
spheres of power and influence.177 In any case, the other side is often in a weaker position. The 
negotiating forum of the WTO not only gave members such as the African-Caribbean-Pacific178 group 
an opportunity to align their position and thereby support each other, but also to benefit from big 
power negotiations by way of MFN and the making of agreements to the benefit of all members. In 
short, ‘as powerful countries “devalue” the WTO’s authority, smaller countries will be stripped of the 
rule of law protection under the WTO system.’179 Additionally, the power imbalance often leads to 
unequal negotiation settings and to less influence of the weaker power on the design of the rules 
and the topics included.180 Overall, the approach of PTAs between smaller groups of States stands in 
stark contrast to the multilateral approach of the WTO. 
  
                                                                 
173  B Condon, To Dystopia and Beyond: The WTO in a Warming Megaregional World, (2019) 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=3384248>. 
174  EU-Singapore and EU-Vietnam FTA (Sustainable development provisions), EU-Mexico Global Agreement 
(Environment provisions), EU-South Korea FTA (Labour provisions), EU-Chile FTA (Competition provision), United 
States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (Currency provisions). 
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Comprehensive Economic Partnership.  
176 S Jinnah, ‘Strategic Linkages: The Evolving Role of Trade Agreements in Global Environmental Governance’ 
(2011), 20 Journal of Environment and Development, 191-215.  
177 Explictly for the US and EU: H Horn et al. (n 164) 2. 
178 Glossary Term WTO: ‘African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. Group of countries with preferential trading 
relations with the EU under the former Lomé Treaty now called the Cotonou Agreement’.  
179 S Cho, (n 21) 32. 
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Part Three: Fixing the WTO – Why and how? 
The developments inside and outside the WTO evoked the picture of the rock and the hard place, 
rendering the multilateral trade organization in its current uncomfortable position. Especially when 
seen in accumulation, the overall picture allows an assessment of the current path for the WTO and 
international economic law more generally (1). Against this background, it is worth asking whether it 
is actually worth saving the WTO (2). In answering in the affirmative, it will be discussed whether the 
WTO could not again be at the forefront of international law, by reverting to majority voting in order 
to overcome the current crisis of the multilateral order (3). 
1. Is International Economic Law in general or only the WTO in particular in 
decline? 
What overall picture appears, when putting the pieces together? Relevant factors for a reflection 
about the course a subfield in international law is taking, might include ‘systematically relevant 
disregard for international law, structural and institutional developments, which challenge its 
integrity, as well as contestations or rejections of a value-based international law’. 181  These 
indicators help to analyse whether ultimately ‘the contemporary “type” of international law is being 
transformed into another type of international law.’182  
The analysis above has shown that inside the WTO all reform efforts have failed in the last years; 
members constantly and increasingly violate especially the agreements related to trade remedies to 
the extent of systemic disregard; trade tensions and violations of the WTO agreements have 
escalated into trade wars and exposed systemic open legal questions regarding the security 
exceptions clause and countermeasures; and finally the destruction of the AB marks a significant 
shift in the functioning of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. These developments are not 
merely isolated incidences but reflective of a systemically relevant disregard for WTO law by more 
than a few members, ultimately challenging the integrity of the organization, accompanied by 
contestations and rejections of the values on which the WTO was founded, including the international 
rule of law. At the same time, members have turned away from the WTO and towards alternative 
agreements and fora, in which they pursue different aims with different strategies. The negative 
impact for the WTO results from the obvious disregard for preconditions of PTAs set by WTO 
agreements, the diversion of interest and effort away from the WTO, the renationalisation of products 
and standard setting increasingly taking place outside of the WTO subject to the spheres of influence 
by major powers, especially the US, China and the EU. For the WTO the developments indicate a 
gradual return to the GATT-era in terms of disposing the compulsory dispute settlement system for 
a more power-based system in which an instrumentalization of economic means for strategic aims 
is under way.  
From a different angle though, it could also be argued that International Economic Law is in fact an 
area in which international law is flourishing. Every year, new comprehensive agreements are 
negotiated and agreed upon and indeed the recent trade agreements deepen economic cooperation 
and include topics such as environment, labour rights and sustainable development in a way further 
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developing the international economic legal framework and international law more generally. 183 
These approaches appear timely and in many ways necessary for a contemporary economic order 
reflective of factors such as systematic human rights violations, a deteriorating environment or 
climate change. In fact, the subordination of economic objectives for other important aims can best 
be achieved if an agreement provides for these goals to be achieved simultaneously instead of 
having to resolve all those tensions by way of interpretation.184 Seen from this angle, International 
Economic Law is further developing and shaping international law in a positive way.  
2. Is the WTO worth saving? 
If the WTO is outdated, ‘unreformable’ and weakened, is then a world with refined and enhanced bi- 
and plurilateral agreements not the preferable scenario and all efforts to save the WTO a waste of 
time? Or could the WTO not just continue operating in the background and later be reformed? Or is 
there more WTO than setting rules and regulations for international trade?  
Of course, the WTO was never perfect. Its rules and regulations were also negotiated and agreed 
upon by a limited number of States, first at the ITO negotiations and later during the Uruguay 
Round.185 It was also always reflective of market power and political strength and the ability of the 
negotiators at the table to translate their interests into the actual outcome of the agreement. 
Especially the Uruguay Round and later the DDA were not able to overcome power imbalances and 
certain shortcomings of the design of the agreements, in particular for those areas that were of 
particular importance to developing members. At the same time, it holds true that much needed 
concepts especially for the better protection of human rights and the environment, that are 
increasingly incorporated into bi- and plurilateral agreements, systemically integrate different 
pillars of international law and have the potential to improve the conditions for both humans and 
the environment along the production chains.  
Yet, and the fundamental shift for the international legal order is significant, those are agreements 
among different subgroups of States. It will ultimately lead to a world of friends and better friends 
on the one side and foes and enemies on the other side, with maybe a number of neutral 
relationships less cared about. The new agreements might reflect much needed concepts and 
developments, but they come at a high price in at least two regards. First, the WTO had a strict rule 
of law approach, including that all rules and regulations were equally enforceable under the dispute 
settlement mechanism. The more recent bi- and plurilateral agreements often provide for less 
stringent approaches in their formulation as well as with regard to the enforcement, especially in 
the ‘trade and’-sections and certainly will not have an oversight mechanism similarly bound to the 
rule of law and comparable to that of the AB overall weakening the rule of law in International 
Economic Law. Second, and even more important, those agreements undermine the post-World War 
II and post-Cold War era that had a global legal framework at the heart of their agenda. The positive 
aspects of modern PTAs among a limited number of States might not outweigh the value the WTO 
has brought to the global order. Only the WTO provides for a global legal framework for trade 
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relations even among those States that would not dare or care to conclude an agreement between 
each other, yielding the rule of law to international relationships that would otherwise be inimical 
or not relevant enough for conclusion of an agreement. The latter ones bear an inherent potential 
to deteriorate at any time. The WTO is potentially open to all members of the international 
community with an appeasing and fencing effect especially for global and regional hegemonic 
powers and truly reflective of the multilateral approach. In sum, the WTO, as rightly summarized by 
Osakwe, ‘is one of the central pillars of the global order. The institution has delivered global public 
goods and welfare, which is more than economic: it has delivered the public goods of security, peace 
and stability.’186 Yet, if it is not treated and cared for, it might turn into a ‘Zombie’ organization187, not 
really alive but also not entirely dead either.  
3. Majority voting as a way out or a further step into the crisis? 
How than could the WTO be saved from further slipping into a comatose condition, inoperable and 
without ever reaching compromises on anything, eventually becoming of ever lesser importance over 
time? One of the most important proposals for overcoming the current crisis has been the suggestion 
to activate the majority voting mechanism.188 It is not something alien to the WTO agreement that 
would need to be implemented, but it is already there: Art. IX.1 WTO agreement especially foresees 
the option that ‘where a decision cannot be arrived at by consensus, the matter at issue shall be 
decided by voting’.  
The design and actual voting mechanism is a long-standing issue in international law especially 
regarding decision making in international organizations.189 An organization may operate well on 
consensus when composed of a limited number of parties thereby preserving the sovereignty of 
States to the greatest extent possible.190 Yet, with destructive States acting in bad faith, the reliance 
on consensus appears preposterous and threatens the WTO as well as the sovereignty of all other 
members. The WTO provides for and even requires (“shall”) majority voting in case consensus cannot 
be reached. In the current crisis, it might be regarded as necessary to activate this mechanism in 
order to oppose those members taking the WTO hostage in their blockage position. For WTO members 
it requires yielding to two consequences: for one, it necessitates accepting the chance of being 
overruled by majority in votings to come. Yet, this might be the price to pay in further developing 
International Economic Law in a WTO with currently 164 member States. Second, it might lead to 
fierce opposition by some members. Yet, at least for now, presumably no member can allow itself to 
withdraw191 from the WTO, not even the most powerful ones. That should strengthen the back of the 
WTO and the supporters of the organization in overcoming blockages and by activating a mechanism 
that is provided for in the founding document of the WTO. The majority voting should first be used 
to revive the AB and should become the default option for any decision.192  
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Would members of the WTO want and accept majority voting? Can they withstand political pressure 
to abstain from promoting majority voting? Defining for a position that is perceived as between a 
rock and hard place is that any solution might require having to refer to a very hard solution. Of 
course, there is a high risk that members would not accept majority voting decisions, that societies 
would not want their governments to be outvoted in Geneva and that States would ultimately 
withdraw from the WTO. At the same time, the WTO members desiring to keep the WTO working, 
cannot further sit and wait while the WTO is paralised and gradually fading.  
If the WTO became an organization that reverts to majority voting in areas of concern to the 
organization and the member as a whole, it could serve as an example for further developing and 
giving effect to international law also in other areas, in which States cling onto their sovereignty 
while constantly assuring that global problems can only be resolved by global approaches. In fact, 
majority voting appears as an effective solution for overcoming an impasse of finding consensus. In 
the past, International Economic Law has often been - similarly to international environmental law - 
at the forefront of developments later taken up in other areas of in international law. International 
Economic Law then has the potential to play a leading role again and function as a stepping-stone 
for the international legal order more generally, emerging out of the crisis in a more robust way than 
before. 
 
Conclusion 
The 1st of January 2020 marked the WTO’s twenty-fifth anniversary since the agreement for its 
establishment entered into force. The past year has however left the organization not exactly in a 
great condition for celebrations. The WTO is not just any organization, but also a symbol for a 
globalized world with global rules for a globalized market. If the WTO were to disappear, the global 
market would remain, only the global rules would have gone. They would be replaced by a 
complicated net of rules and agreements among friends and allies diverting trade along the lines of 
power and influence.  
For some, the post-WTO might not look altogether grim, but rather bear great potential. Almost 
enthusiastically, it was suggested:  
If the WTO were to disappear, the simplest answer for what to do in a post-WTO world is to 
recreate the WTO. We have a model that works. Let’s just replicate it. But as it is sometimes 
said, ‘Why let a good crisis go to waste?’ If the WTO disappears or is no longer functioning, and 
we then have the opportunity to start fresh, let’s aim high. Why not strive for perfection, or, at 
the least, excellence, rather than just muddling through as we usually do? 193 
It might be true that every crisis bares the potential for something new and better. Yet, the risk for a 
steep deepening of the crisis of global relations before we reach a point of return again, might be 
greatly underestimated. There might be little chance for developing a new and better WTO, when 
compromise is already difficult to be reached for individual rules and agreements. With regard to 
the WTO it might then feel as though you don’t know what you had until you lost it.194 Answers and 
solutions should thus be searched within and for the WTO. Hope and effort to save the WTO and 
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develop it further, strengthening it to be better equipped for the challenges currently posed by its 
members and to the earth in its entirety, should thus prevail over ideas to establish relations based 
on power and influence or on recreating something that might prove very difficult to be rebuild.  
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